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Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)

Note verbale dated 28 October 2004 from the Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee

The Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), and has the honour to submit the Finnish national report, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) (see annex).

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Annex to the note verbale dated 28 October 2004 from the Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee

Finnish National Report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)

1. Finland considers the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1540 as a great importance and is fuliy committed to the work of the 1540 Committee in ensuring the full implementation of this resolution, including — where appropriate — through providing assistance or advice to others.

2. Finland being a Member States of the European Union (EU), reference is made to the EU Common Report that will be transmitted to the UNSC 1540 Special Committee separately. The EU Report covers areas of EU and Community competences and activities in relation to UNSC Resolution 1540 and should be read in conjunction with this national report.

3. The Finnish Government's report to Parliament on Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004 makes a broad assessment of Finland's security and defence policy as a whole. The report was published in September and is currently being dealt with in parliamentary hearings. National measures to counter the threat of WMD proliferation are among the most important issues in this report.

4. Finland has taken a range of legislative measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and we continuously review our policies, with a view to establish what further measures may be necessary.

Legislative action

5. Finland has a wide range of legislative measures in place to prevent the proliferation of WMD, including by non-state actors. The centrepieces of this legislative framework are the Nuclear Weapons Act (203/1970,) the Biological Weapons Act (257/1975), the Chemical Weapons Act (346/1997), the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987), the Act on the Control of Exports of Dual-Use Goods (562/1996) and the Penal Code, and their amendments. The Penal Code contains provisions that can be applied to terrorist acts.

6. Detailed responses as to how the Finland's legislative framework relates to specific issues raised in SCR 1540 are set out below.

Executive action

7. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) is in charge of the Finnish non-proliferation policy, the foreign and security as well as trade policy aspects of export controls. In the MFA, the Political Department and its Unit for Arms Control, Disarmament and

Non-Proliferation, coordinate Finland's participation in the international cooperation concerned, for example in the export control regimes. The MFA's Department of External Economic Relations monitors export controls from a trade policy point of view. It is also the authority which grants authorisations for exports of dual-use goods (except Cat.0). The Energy Department of the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) and, under it, the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), are the authorities which grant authorisations for exports of nuclear materials, facilities and equipment (Category 0 of Annex I to the EC Export Control Regulation).

8. The Advisory Board on Export Controls, under the External Economic Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, is a coordinating inter-agency body for dual-use export controls. Its mandate is to advise on relevant matters concerning domestic legislation, Finland's participation in relevant international cooperation guidelines for licensing, and individual license applications or prior enquiries, if they have foreign policy implications. The following authorities are represented in the Advisory Board: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Transport and Communications, the National Board of Customs and the Finnish Security Police. In addition, the Technology Industries of Finland has a representative on the Board.

9. The Advisory Committee for Export of Defence Materiel under the Resource Policy Department of the Ministry of Defence is the corresponding inter-agency body with a mandate to advise on individual licence applications, prior enquiries and definition of defence materiel, for exports of military items. The following authorities are represented in the Committee: the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (the Political Department and the Department for External Economic Relations), the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Staff, the Ministry of the Interior (the Police Department), the National Board of Customs and the Finnish Security Police.

10. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs monitors the implementation of SCR1540, and has overseen the preparation of Finland's response to the 1540 Committee.

Enforcement action

11. Finnish Customs have the lead responsibility for preventing imports and exports of unlicensed goods, investigating offences, and taking appropriate action.

12. The Frontier Guard performs border surveillance on Finland's national borders and carries out border checks on persons entering and leaving the country at border crossing points. In connection with border checks, the Frontier Guard supervises traffic and compliance with the legal provisions concerning possession of firearms, ammunition and other dangerous objects, intoxicants, radioactive substances, and explosives and other dangerous substances.

Encouraging compliance

13. Finnish authorities inform exporters about export controls on regular basis in order to promote effective compliance. Updated information on export controls is disseminated through governmental websites, publications, seminars and workshops.

In the European Union

14. Finland has contributed actively establishing effective policies within the European Union (EU) and to prevent WMD proliferation, and will continue to do so. The Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003 agreed that preventing the proliferation of WMD should be a priority for the Union, both internally and in its relations with third countries, and agreed on an Action Plan for addressing the issue.

15. The European Council in December 2003 approved a Strategy for preventing the proliferation of WMD, which the EU is in the process of implementing. Finland has participated actively, as a representative of the Member States, in the work of the Task Force on Peer Review, which was established according to the Action Plan for the implementation of the Basic Principles for and the EU strategy against Proliferation of WMD. For example, in November 2003 the EU agreed a model non-proliferation clause to be included in all future EU-third country mixed agreements.

International Instruments

16. Finland is a State Party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) as well as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The prohibitions in the latter are enacted in Finnish law.

17. Finland has adopted an Additional Protocol to its IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Implementation of the Additional Protocol started in 2004 following a decision that all the EU Member States should bring Additional Protocols into force simultaneously.

18. Finland is also an active participant in all the export control regimes, notably the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Zangger Committee, the Australia Group (AG), and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA). Finland chaired the Zangger Committee in 1989-93, the NSG in 1995-96 and the MTCR in 2000-01. The export control regimes play an important role in agreeing control lists and raising international standards on export control. Finland is also a signatory to the Hague Code of Conduct on Ballistic Missiles.

19. Since September 2001, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Australia Group (AG) and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) have all formally adopted 'terrorism clauses' to deny terrorists' access to the

items they control. These export control regimes have followed up with increased exchanges of information to improve awareness of possible procurement attempts by terrorists.

20. Finland has expressed its support to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

Technical Assistance to Other States

21. Finland is fully committed to the work of the 1540 Committee in ensuring the global implementation of this resolution, including - where appropriate - through providing assistance or advice to others.

22. Finland is committed to the non-proliferation of nuclear materials and supports actively the strengthening and development of international safeguards related to the NPT. Accordingly Finland has established international safeguards support and cooperation programmes for Ukraine, for the Baltic States and for the Russian Federation. About 3.9 million euros have been used for these programmes since 1994.

23. Finland has participated actively in the IAEA's Coordinated Technical Support Programme (CTSP) to the NIS. Under the CTSP, Finland provided bilateral support and assistance to the Baltic States and to Ukraine in improving their systems for nuclear material control, including nuclear material accountancy and control, physical protection and export/import control. In 1995 - 2002 Finland contributed to the CTSP also through the Finnish Support Programme to the IAEA by funding a cost-free expert (CFE) to participate in the coordination work of the IAEA. In 2003, the Finnish CFE was assigned tasks related to nuclear security as in kind contribution to the IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund (NSF). Finland has also contributed the Nuclear Security Fund 10 000 euros in 2004.

24. Since 1997 Finland has had a bilateral co-operation programme with Russia which focuses on procedures to prevent illicit trafficking and to protect nuclear material against other illegal activities. So far, about 200 000 euros have been allocated annually for this programme.

25. Since 1990, the Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN) has offered, on a regular basis, basic and advanced training in analytical chemistry to help the implementation of the CWC in developing countries. In 2002, a new training course on national authority and chemical databases was offered. So far, some 150 experts from more than 64 countries have attended the training courses. In addition, VERIFIN organizes seminars and workshops and provides opportunities for foreign interns in the OPCW internship support programme. In 2003, the total expenditure in training amounted to EUR 360.000, and in 2004 the foreseen expenditure is EUR 325.000.

26. Finland participates in the destruction of the chemical weapons stockpiles in the Russian Federation in the framework of the G8 Global Partnership programme. So far, Finland has provided a fixed chemical warfare agent detection network in the Russian Federation (Kambarka and Gorny) with a total of EUR 1.000.000. The next cooperation project is under discussion.

27. The Particular Task-Force (TF) on Organised Crime in the Baltic Sea Region was set up in 1996 by the Heads of Government of the Baltic Sea States. At the beginning, the TF organised its work in expert groups dealing with narcotics, illegal migration, stolen vehicles, smuggling of highly taxed goods, trafficking in women and money laundering. Work on international gangs, cyber crime and environmental crime was included later. Special attention has been paid to combating terrorism. Finland has been the lead country in combating money laundering. Finland will take over the chairmanship of the TF from the beginning of 2005.

28. Finland organised a Border Management seminar for some Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) in June 2002. The program included a presentation of the border control system and the border control cooperation as well as introduction the Finnish customs system - both in theory and practice.

Comments in relation to the specific issues raised by UNSCR 1540:

Operative Paragraph 1

Decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery

Finland does not provide any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. Any such support is prohibited under Finnish law. The relevant Finnish legislation is set out in this report.

Operative Paragraph 2

Decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them;

Action taken

Section 4 of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987 as amended) and Chapters 34 and 34 a of the Penal Code forbid and make punishable imports of nuclear explosives as well as their fabrication, possession and detonation in Finland. The maximum penalty is ten years of imprisonment.

The Chemical Weapons Act (346/1997 as amended) and Chapter 11, Section 7, of the Penal Code forbid and make punishable any development, production, stockpiling, possession and transport of chemical weapons and any participation in military preparations for the use of chemical weapons. The maximum penalty is six years of imprisonment.

The Biological Weapons Act (257/1975) and Chapter 11, Section 7 b of the Penal Code forbid any unlawful preparation, transport and delivery of a biological weapon or a toxin weapon. The Section concerned also forbids any development, preparation, other procurement, storage or possession of a biological weapon or a toxin weapon or weapons, devices or equipment for the dissemination of a biological weapon or a toxin weapon in violation of an international convention on the development, production and storage of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. The maximum penalty is six years of imprisonment.

The Penal Code also contains provisions on penalties applied to offences committed with a terrorist intention in a separate Chapter (34 a). This Chapter provides for the sentences

applied to terrorist offences and their planning, to the directing of a terrorist group, to the promoting of a terrorist group, and to the financing of terrorism. The Chapter also contains a provision defining terrorist offences, a provision on the right of prosecution and a provision on corporate liability. An increased sentence may be passed where the offence has been committed with a terrorist intention, the maximum penalty being twelve years of imprisonment.

A new provision on sanctions applicable to violations of the prohibition on chemical weapons was also added to the Penal Code. The existing provisions prohibiting the hijacking of aircraft or vessels were adjusted, and the attempt of aggravated criminal damage was established as an offence. The amendment to the Coercive Measures Act increases in some respects the coercive means available to the police in the context of criminal investigations.

The Maritime Security Measures Act 2004 entered into force on 1 July 2004. It obliged the Maritime Administration, the Frontier Guard, the Customs and the Police to control that dangerous objects (including NBC) shall not cause any risk to vessels, harbours and persons staying in them.

Planned Action

Finland is considering what further action may be necessary.

Operative Paragraph 3

Decides also that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall:

(a)Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport;

Action taken

According to Sections 3 and 8 of the Nuclear Energy Act, any possession, production, transfer, handling, use, storage, transport, export and import of nuclear materials as well as any possession, transfer, export and import of non-nuclear materials, nuclear devices, equipment and nuclear information (technology and software) is prohibited without a license.

The Euratom (the European Atomic Energy Community) and IAEA nuclear safeguards are applied in Finland. The Additional Protocol came into force on 30 April 2004. The Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987 as amended) establishes a national nuclear accounting and control system, which complements the safeguards system created by the Euratom Treaty,

Title II, Chapter 7. Pursuant to Section 118 of the Nuclear Energy Degree, this system is maintained by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). National as well as Euratom and IAEA inspections are carried out to verify operators' reports and records.

Finland has created a national database on its industries involved in activities relevant to the CWC. According to the legislation concerned, the industries are obliged to report, to the national authority, all chemicals that, by their type and/or amount, fall in categories defined reportable according to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

According to the Firearms Act (1/1998) any trade, acquisition, possession and manufacture of firearms, firearm components, cartridges and specially dangerous projectiles is subject to authorisation. What is provided on firearms in the Firearms Act also applies to missile and rocket-launcher systems. The Ministry of the Interior grants and revokes permits for carrying on firearms trade. A firearms dealer entitled to trade on, manufacture, repair or convert firearms is obliged to keep a file of the firearms. The police examines at least once a year the files kept by the firearms dealers, as well as their bookkeeping, stores and storage facilities

Planned action

Finland is considering what further action may be necessary.

(b)Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures;

Action taken

Finland is party to the Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and applies the IAEA's recommendation on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC 225/Rev.4 Corrected). Finland supports the proposed amendment to revise the CPPNM.

Section 9 of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987 as amended) obligates each licence-holder to assure any physical protection measures the responsibility for which does not rest with authorities. These measures are specified in a relevant Decision of the Council State (396/1991).

Planned action

Finland is considering what further action may be necessary

(c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law;

Action taken:

In recent years, the Finnish Customs have taken a number of measures in order to enhance the enforcement of export control at the borders. Common IT systems are being developed by the police, customs and frontier guard authorities for intelligence and investigation purposes. Furthermore, the training program on export control provided to Customs officers has been extended in order to take into account expected future developments and to better meet future requirements. Applications of risk analysis techniques and increased exchange of information at national and international level are key elements taught in the extended training program.

All the international crossing points on the Eastern border of Finland as well as the airport and a port (Länsisatama) in Helsinki have been equipped with stationary radiation monitors to screen illicit movements of radioactive materials. In addition, there is one mobile monitoring unit, which is used mainly in ports.

Legislative action

-Act on the Control of Export of Dual-Use Goods (562/1996). By virtue of section 7 of the Act, the Customs has the right of inspection and access to information to carry out its control task.

-Customs Act (1466/1994). The Customs authorities have very wide administrative and investigative powers (including the use of coercive means), which can also be used for export control purposes.

- Penalties for actual or attempted intentional violations of the Act on the Control of Dual-Use Goods are imposed under chapter 46, sections 1-3 of the Finnish Penal Code (39/1889); fines, imprisonment for a maximum of 4 years.

Information on transport of suspicious items has been exchanged between national and international law enforcement agencies. During the period under review there have not been any illegal attempts to transport weapons of mass destruction through the Finnish national borders.

The Act on the Control of Export of Dual-Use Goods (562/1996) provides new controls on trafficking and brokering in military and certain other sensitive goods.

Provisions on controlling defence material brokering were included in the Act on the Export and Transit of Defence Materiel and entered into force in December 2002 (Act on the Export and Transit of Defence Materiel 242/1990; as amended 900/2002). The concept of defence materiel is basically identical to the coverage of the Wassenaar Munitions' List as well as the EU Common List of Military Equipment.

The guiding principle is simple: the same controls apply to brokering and to export and transit of defence materiel. This means that each individual brokering transaction is subject to a brokering licence. The licensing requirement applies to brokering activities

taking place in Finnish territory. In addition, there is an extraterritorial scope of the application: if the brokering transaction takes place outside Finnish territory, the licensing requirement applies whenever the broker is a Finnish citizen, a Finnish legal entity or a Finnish resident.

Finland also applies a strict policy when it comes to end-use controls. An end-user certificate is a mandatory prerequisite for granting a brokering licence in all cases and to all destinations. The penalties for violations of brokering and end-use controls are the same, ranging from fines to four years of imprisonment.

Planned action:

The introduction of two mobile X-ray units in the Southern Customs District at the end of 2004 and in the Eastern Custom District at the beginning of 2005 will assist the Customs enforcement in preventing the spreading of weapons of mass destruction.

Finland is considering what further action may be necessary

(d)Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations

Action taken:

The export control executed by Finland is mainly based on Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 and the national Act on the Control of Exports of Dual-Use Goods (562/1996). The national Act amounts to a concise domestic legal framework on dual-use controls, containing only the essential provisions, but referring in all other respects to the EU system. The Government Decree on the Control of Export of Dual-Use Goods (924/2000) lays down further provisions on the implementation of the Act.

Chapter 34, section 8 of the Nuclear Energy Act 1987 (990/1987 as amended), creates an export license system as well as a transport license system for nuclear materials and related nuclear-specific items. Violations of the requirement for an export licence are subject to criminal penalties. A licence is required for any transport of nuclear materials and nuclear waste in Finland or through Finnish territory. In case of transit of nuclear items, an import, export and transport (only for nuclear material and nuclear waste) license is required, when applicable.

According to Section 7 of the Act on the Export and Transit of Defence Materiel (242/1990), any person who illegally exports defence materiel or who assigns or transfers abroad a licence to manufacture defence materiel or who transports, through Finnish territory, defence materiel to a third country, or brokers defence materiel, or attempts to do so, shall be fined or imprisoned for a maximum period of four years for committing an export offence.

The Customs in Finland have very wide administrative and investigative powers when detecting violations. Even though goods are being carried under cover of an international Customs transit procedure, according to Article 5 of the TIR Convention, the Customs have, in exceptional cases, the right to inspect goods at intermediate customs offices in order to prevent misuse, and according to Section 14 of the Customs Act, the Customs authority may detain goods exported from or imported into the country, if there is reasonable cause for this in order to prevent or investigate a crime.

Furthermore, the International Convention on the Harmonization of Frontier Controls of Goods, done at Geneva on 21 October 1982, which entered into force on 8 November 1985, gives the Customs the right to control goods in transit in cases where controls are required by prevailing conditions or risk factors.

End-user control - see above 3c

Planned action:

Finland is considering what further action may be necessary.

Operative Paragraph 5

Decides that none of the obligations set forth in this resolution shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Finland is a State Party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Finland is also an active member of the IAEA and the OPCW.

Operative Paragraph 6

Recognizes the utility in implementing this resolution of effective national control lists and calls upon all Member States, when necessary, to pursue at the earliest opportunity the development of such lists.

Action taken

Finland is a strong supporter of effective multilateral export control regimes and is an active member of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, the Australian Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Zangger Committee, and the Wassenaar Arrangement. In this regard, Finland participates actively in the technical experts' groups of the regimes in order to update the control lists in accordance with technological developments.

Operative Paragraph 7

Recognizes that some States may require assistance in implementing the provisions of this resolution within their territories and invites States in a position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the States lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling the above provisions

Finland recognises that some States may require assistance in implementing the provisions of this resolution within their territories.

Finland is willing to provide assistance, as appropriate, in response to specific requests, to the States lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling the provisions of Security Council resolution 1540.

Requests for assistance concerning policy issues should be directed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Unit for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, P.O.Box 176, FIN-00161 Helsinki, POL-05@formin.fi, Tel: +358-9-16005.

Requests for assistance concerning licensing should be directed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Export Control Unit, P.O.Box 176, FIN-00161 Helsinki, KPO-08@formin.fi, Tel: +358-9-16005.

Operative Paragraph 8

Calls upon all States:

(a)To promote the universal adoption and full implementation, and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are parties, whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons;

Action taken

Finland has coordinated activities facilitating the entry into force of CTBT (2003-2005).

The EU Common Position was agreed in November 2003 on the universalisation of the main multilateral non-proliferation agreements (CWC, BTWC, NPT).

Finland also supports the universalisation of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Model Additional Protocol as a new verification standard.

Finland has supported lobbying for non-state parties to join multilateral treaties in order to achieve their universal application.

Planned action

Finland will continue to promote the universal adoption and full implementation, and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.

(b)To adopt national rules and regulations, where it has not yet been done, to ensure compliance with their commitments under the key multilateral non-proliferation treaties

Action taken

Finland believes that it is already compliant with its commitments under the key multilateral non-proliferation treaties.

The centrepieces of this legislative framework are the Nuclear Weapons Act (203/1970,) the Biological Weapons Act (257/1975), the Chemical Weapons Act (346/1997), the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987), the Act on the Control of Exports of Dual-Use Goods (562/1996), the Penal Code and their amendments. The Penal Code contains also provisions that can be applied to terrorist acts.

(c)To renew and fulfil their commitment to multilateral cooperation, in particular within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of non-proliferation and of promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes;

Finland continues to provide support for the work of the IAEA. Since 1998 Finland has provided extra budgetary support to the IAEA through a safeguards support programme. At the moment, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs allocates 300 000 euros for the programme annually, and the main areas of activities are training of the IAEA inspectors and development and testing of instruments and methods related to nuclear material verification.

Finland also continues to participate actively in the work of the OPCW and the BTWC by taking part in their conferences and meetings. To promote multilateral cooperation Finland has also invested in research and methods development in the field of analytical chemistry for chemical disarmament. The results of these activities have been published in scientific articles, monograph series, encyclopaedias and a book. Finland will continue its support to

the OPCW through various training programmes to help the implementation of the CWC in developing countries.

Finland has sent a delegation of relevant experts to the BWC meetings in 2003 and 2004, including experts from the defence forces as well as the civilian sector. These active expert level discussions will be followed up at the 2006 BWC Review Conference, which will coincide with the EU presidency of Finland.

(d)To develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding their obligations under such laws;

Action taken

Nuclear Energy Degree, Section 129-130: Every licence holder shall appoint a person responsible for nuclear material control of the nuclear facility. This person must have an authorization granted by STUK. One of the requirements is that he/she knows the relevant legislation and regulations.

As part of intensified outreach efforts, the Finnish authorities involved in export control arranged a seminar in February 2003 in order to inform the Finnish industry about recent developments in international export control, as well as developments and changes in the national export control system. The event was attended by more than 150 company representatives.

The Finnish authorities have a close working relationship with the Finnish industry. A representative of the Technology Industries in the Advisory Board on Export Controls is an example of this. Information is also provided to industries and the public by websites, publications and leaflets.

Planned action

Finland is considering what further action may be necessary.

Operative Paragraph 9

Calls upon all States to promote dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation so as to address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and their means of delivery

Finland continues to promote dialogue and co-operation on non-proliferation in a range of fora so as to address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and their means of delivery.

Finland has engaged in meetings with national authorities of neighbouring countries concerning the CWC. The purpose of these meetings is to share information, and they are considered to be productive occasions for exchanging views on non-proliferation of chemical weapons.

Operative Paragraph 10

Further to counter that threat, calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials;

Finland has taken part as observer in Proliferation Security Initiative exercises.

On a national level, Finland will enhance the co-operation between different national authorities in order to be better prepared to counter the proliferation of WMD and related material and to be better prepared to respond to consequences of their possible use.

As one example of enhanced co-operation between national authorities, Finland is planning to establish a Centre for Excellence for Biological Preparedness, including expertise from civilian and defence sectors.

Operative Paragraph 11

Expresses its intention to monitor closely the implementation of this resolution and, at the appropriate level, to take further decisions, which may be required to this end;

Finland will review the actions of this resolution at the national level on a later date and take any further decisions which may be required.